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Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court of the United States's
third decision in four years relating to the Guant~namo Bay de-
tainees,' definitively rejected Congress's efforts to close the feder-
al courts to habeas petitions from those detainees.2 In doing so, it
effectively discarded the procedures and framework that the
President and Congress created in the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 ("DTA")3 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006
("MCA").4 The Court, however, explicitly left undetermined the
content of the federal habeas proceedings that are now to take
place,5 an omission that did not escape Chief Justice Roberts's
criticism.6
Under close reading, however, Boumediene strongly suggests
that the detainees are entitled not only to judicial review of their
detention via habeas petitions, but also to representation by
counsel-though not necessarily appointed counsel-in those pro-
ceedings, absent legitimate suspension of habeas corpus by Con-
gress.7 Devoid of context, this no doubt would be an entirely un-
* Professor of Law and Claire Ferguson Carlson Fellow, University of Iowa. J.D.,
1995, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Thanks to Paul Stempel for research
assistance.
1. The other cases relating to detainees were Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006) and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
2. See 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240, 2274-75 (2008).
3. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. § 801 note, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd and note (2006)).
4. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
5. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277 ("[O]ur opinion does not address the content of the
law that governs petitioners' detention."); see also id. at 2266 ("We do not endeavor to offer
a comprehensive summary of the requisites for an adequate substitute for habeas cor-
pus.").
6. Id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
7. See id. at 2260.
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surprising result. The striking thing about the Court's near insis-
tence on counsel is that it comes in the face of the executive
branch's repeated warnings that Al-Qaeda members are engaging
in "lawfare"-the use of the legal system as another tool in their
asymmetric terrorism against the United States.'
In this essay, I examine Boumediene's implicit rejection of the
argument that lawfare is serious enough to warrant denial of
counsel. Part II traces the Court's decisions on extraterritorial
application of the Constitution (in particular, habeas) to non-
citizens outside the country, beginning with the post-World War
II case of Johnson v. Eisentrager,9 continuing through the recent
terrorism cases, and concluding with a detailed examination of
Boumediene. Part III turns to lawfare, defining the term and con-
sidering the government's claim that A1-Qaeda has trained its
members to use the American legal system. This part concludes
with a discussion of the Lynne Stewart case, in which the gov-
ernment successfully prosecuted a criminal defense attorney for
aiding her client's efforts to perpetuate his terrorist group's activ-
ities. Finally, Part IV considers why the Boumediene Court may
not have viewed lawyers and lawfare as a serious threat to na-
tional security, given the tools that the government could use to
protect itself: security clearance requirements and the ability to
monitor attorney-client communications. Part V concludes.
II. ENEMY COMBATANTS AND RIGHTS
At the time the Supreme Court decided Boumediene, the Unit-
ed States was detaining between 265 and 270 suspected Al-Qaeda
and Taliban fighters at its naval base on Guant~inamo Bay, Cu-
ba.' Hundreds of other detainees had been released outright or
8. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2007,
at All.
9. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
10. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Office of the Assistant Sec'y of Def. (Public
Affairs), Detainee Transfer Announced (July 2, 2008), [hereinafter July 2008 Press Re-
lease], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaselD=12037
(reporting 265 detainees just after Boumediene); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Office of
the Assistant Sec'y of Def. (Public Affairs), Detainee Transfer Announced (May 2, 2008),
available at http://www.defenselink.millReleases/Release.aspx?ReleaselD=11893 (report-
ing 270 detainees just prior to Boumediene). President Obama has since issued an execu-
tive order to close the detention facility within a year. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed.
Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
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repatriated to their home nations for detention since 2002.1 Dur-
ing that time, the detention facility came to symbolize the per-
ceived excesses of the United States' global war on terrorism: a
law-free zone in which the government was able to subject detai-
nees to coercive interrogation, if not outright torture. 12 For some
critics, any form of military detention was unlawful, as they ar-
gued that captured fighters should be processed through the
criminal justice system. 13 For others, the problem lay not so much
in the use of military detention as in the absence of adequate
process to ensure reasonably accurate determinations of both the
status and the dangerousness of those detained.14 In this part of
the essay, I examine the doctrinal developments with respect to
enemy combatants and due process/habeas rights, beginning with
the pre-9/11 precedents, continuing through the statutory inter-
pretation cases, Rasul and Hamdan, and finishing with Boume-
diene, emphasizing that my focus is on the case law addressing
court access by aliens outside sovereign U.S. territory.
A. Pre-2004 Law
In 1950, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. Eisentrager,
which was seemingly the most relevant case on point at the time
the Court accepted its initial set of post-9/11 terrorism cases in
2004.15 The respondents in Eisentrager were German nationals
11. July 2008 Press Release, supra note 10 ("Since 2002, more than 500 detainees
have departed Guantanamo for other countries .. ").
12. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, GUANTANAMO-AN ICON OF LAWLESSNESS, available at
http://www.amnesty.orgen/library/asset/AMR51/002/2005/en/dom-AMR510022005en.pdf
(alleging four categories of "lawlessness" related to Guantdnamo Bay); David Glazier, A
Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over the Guantdnamo Military Com-
missions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131 (2008). Jennifer Daskal, Lawless in Guantdnamo,
SALON.COM, May 2, 2008, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/05/02/hamdan/ (de-
scribing Guantdnamo procedures as "unmoored from American criminal law, the Constitu-
tion and international law").
13. See Gabor Rona, "War" Doesn't Justify Guantanamo, FIN. TIMES, Mar 1, 2004, at
17 (contending that prisoners of war "can and should face trial, but not by military
courts"); Kenneth Roth, After Guantdnamo: The Case Against Preventive Detention,
FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2008, at 12. See generally RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J.
BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM
CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2008), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/080521-
USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf (advocating increased use of federal criminal prosecution as an
effective alternative to military tribunals for terrorism cases).
14. See, e.g., Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: A Non-
Criminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 209-10 (2005).
15. See 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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who had been convicted in American military courts located in
China for essentially continuing to wage war against the United
States after Germany's surrender.16 Following their convictions,
the German nationals were repatriated to, and imprisoned in,
Germany and controlled by the United States Army.17 They filed
habeas petitions, arguing that the military trials violated Articles
I and III of the Constitution and their Fifth Amendment rights,
as well as the 1929 Geneva Convention, provisions of which go-
vern the treatment of prisoners of war.'" The United States Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted the petition, but the Su-
preme Court reversed, noting that no court had ever extended
habeas corpus to "an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in
no stage of his captivity, has been within [the] territorial jurisdic-
tion" of the country.' 9
Justice Jackson's opinion was hardly a model of clarity: one
cannot ascertain whether the decision was based on a lack of ju-
risdiction or a substantive determination that the prisoners had
no constitutional rights. Subsequent federal cases, however, have
denied aliens outside the United States access to our courts, even
if challenging their detention; notably, many of these cases specif-
ically involved Guantdnamo Bay.2°
No doubt motivated in part, if not in whole, by its reading of
precedent such as Eisentrager, the Bush Administration trans-
ferred hundreds of suspected A1-Qaeda and Taliban fighters to a
detention camp set up at the Guanttnamo Bay naval base.2' Not
16. Id. at 765-66. At the time, the United States was still engaged in active armed
conflict against Japan, and the respondents were passing information about U.S. troop
movements to the Japanese military. Id. at 766.
17. Id. at 766.
18. Id. at 767.
19. Id. at 768, 791.
20. See Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir. 1995);
Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1513-15 (11th Cir. 1992); Bird v. Unit-
ed States, 923 F. Supp. 338, 341-43 (D. Conn. 1996); Fed'n for Am. Immigration Reform,
Inc. v. Reno, 897 F. Supp. 595, 598, 605 (D.D.C. 1995). Eric Posner argues that Eisentrager
should be understood as basing its decision on two independent reasons: (1) the intolerable
burden on the military of allowing enemy aliens to call soldiers to account for their deten-
tion; and (2) the "limited constitutional status of the noncitizen." See Eric A. Posner, Bou-
mediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism 1, 4-5 (Univ. of Chicago
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 228, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1211426.
21. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 497-98 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("To-
day, the Court springs a trap on the Executive, subjecting Guantdnamo Bay to the over-
sight of the federal courts even though it has never before been thought to be within their
[Vol. 43:865
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long after, detainees started filing habeas petitions in federal dis-
trict courts across the country to challenge their detention at the
base.22
B. Rasul and Hamdan
These habeas cases reached the Supreme Court in 2004 when,
in Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that, notwithstanding Eisentrag-
er, the Guantdnamo detainees were entitled to file habeas peti-
tions in federal court.23 Rasul appeared, however, merely to in-
terpret the federal habeas corpus statute to extend to petitions
brought by persons detained at Guantdnamo Bay.24 Though the
Court discussed a number of different theories, including the
United States' effective control over Guantdnamo Bay, it ulti-
mately held "that [28 U.S.C.] § 2241 confers on the District Court
jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to the
legality of their detention."25
As the detainee habeas petitions proceeded through the lower
courts after Rasul, one district court judge dismissed a series of
Guantdnamo habeas petitions on the ground that Rasul was sa-
tisfied once the petitions were filed because Rasul gave detainees
no substantive rights; it merely answered the question of jurisdic-
tion.26
Congress enacted the DTA27 in response to Rasul. Among other
things, the DTA purported to eliminate nearly all federal court
jurisdiction over habeas petitions by Guantinamo detainees-the
sole exception was that the D.C. Circuit was granted jurisdiction
to review final decisions of Combatant Status Review Tribunals
("CSRTs") or military commissions. 2' The DTA contained one pro-
jurisdiction-and thus making it a foolish place to have housed alien wartime detainees.").
22. See id. at 471-72.
23. Id. at 484. Rasul was part of a trio of terrorism cases issued on the same day. The
other two cases, however, involved American citizens detained on U.S. soil. See Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430, 432 (2004).
24. See Tung Yin, The Role of Article III Courts in the War on Terrorism, 13 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1061, 1064-65 (2005).
25. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-84.
26. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 322-23 (D.D.C. 2005).
27. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. § 801 note, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd and note (2006)).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006) ("Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consid-
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vision stating that its effective date was the date of enactment, 29
but it had another provision stating that "pending" claims chal-
lenging either status determinations by CSRTs or convictions by
military courts were subject to the newly devised D.C. Circuit ju-
risdiction.3 °
One such case pending before the Supreme Court at the time of
the DTA's enactment was a habeas petition filed by Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, a Guantdnamo detainee who had been designated for
prosecution by a military commission. 3' According to the govern-
ment, Hamdan had served as A1-Qaeda founder and leader Osa-
ma bin Laden's driver and bodyguard and had violated various
laws of war by conspiring to attack civilians and civilian objects,
to commit murder, and to engage in terrorism.32 The district court
had granted Hamdan's petition, only to be reversed by the D.C.
Circuity.
In a 5-3 decision, 4 the Supreme Court held that the DTA's ju-
risdiction-stripping provision applied only to those pending cases
that were subject to exclusive D.C. Circuit review.3 ' Because
Hamdan's case was pending on the effective date of the DTA but
failed to fall into either category of cases subject to exclusive D.C.
Circuit review, the Court concluded that its jurisdiction remained
intact.36
Significantly, the Court arrived at this conclusion as a matter
of statutory interpretation. Though it hinted that withdrawal of
its appellate jurisdiction over pending cases such as Hamdan's
would raise a serious Suspension Clause problem,37 the Court
er" any habeas petition or other action brought by an alien detained at Guantdnamo Bay).
29. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(h)(1), 199 Stat. at 2743; see also 10 U.S.C.
§ 801 note (2006).
30. Id. § 1005(h)(2), 119 Stat. at 2743-44; see also 10 U.S.C. § 801 note (2006).
31. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566-67 (2006).
32. Id. at 569-70 (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. 65a-67a, Hamdan, 548
U.S. 557 (No. 04-5393)).
33. Id. at 567.
34. Chief Justice Roberts recused himself from the case because he sat on the D.C.
Circuit panel whose decision the Court reviewed. See id. at 635.
35. Id. at 578-84.
36. See id. at 583.
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
[Vol. 43:865
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made clear that it was interpreting the DTA to avoid a constitu-
tional issue.38
The concurring justices suggested answers for the constitution-
al issue. In a key concurrence, Justice Breyer wrote that
"[niothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to
seek the authority he believes necessary."39 Similarly, Justice
Kennedy invoked in his concurrence the classic three-zone sepa-
ration-of-powers framework from the Steel Seizure case and ar-
gued that the President's power was at its lowest ebb because he
acted in conflict with the detailed Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice enacted by Congress.4 °
C. Boumediene
Responding to the Court's suggestion in Hamdan that the Pres-
ident needed congressional authority for his military commis-
sions, Congress passed the MCA.41 Among other things, the MCA
(1) authorized military commissions for Guantdnamo detainees;42
(2) codified law-of-war violations triable by military commission;43
(3) codified the procedures to be used in military commissions;'
and (4) clarified that the jurisdiction-stripping amendments to
the federal habeas corpus statute applied to all pending cases
brought by Guantdnamo detainees.45
The MCA thus essentially negated Hamdan's interpretation of
the DTA. Not surprisingly, many commentators viewed the
enactment of the statute as a victory for the President.46 Even af-
38. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 584 n.15.
39. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 638-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, (Steel Seizure) 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
41. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
42. Id. § 3(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2602 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 9486 (2006)).
43. Id. § 3(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2626-30 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b) (2006)).
44. Id. § 3(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2603-25 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948h-950j (2006)).
45. Id. § 7(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2441) (stating that the
DTA's withdrawal of jurisdiction "shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act,
and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act").
46. See, e.g., Editorial, Rushing Off a Cliff, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2006, at A22; Posting
of Jack M. Balkin, to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/09/what-hamdan-ha
th-wrought.html (Sept. 29, 2006, 06:00 EST) ("Viewed from another perspective, the Mili-
tary Commissions Bill was nothing less than a smackdown of the Supreme Court .... ").
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ter passage of the MCA, however, few detainees were slated for
prosecution. David Hicks pleaded guilty to material-support
charges and was repatriated to his native country of Australia.47
Subsequently, Hamdan was convicted of providing material sup-
port for terrorism (but acquitted of more serious charges) in a mil-
itary commission, as constituted under the MCA. 48 He received a
sentence of sixty-six months, which, with credit for the time spent
in detention, amounted to about five more months of detention.49
Meanwhile, the remaining detainees not slated for prosecution
now faced dismissal of their habeas petitions.5" A large number of
the cases were consolidated for appeal before the D.C. Circuit as
Boumediene v. Bush."' In light of the MCA, the D.C. Circuit held
that its jurisdiction to entertain the habeas petitions-which
were not challenges to CSRT findings or to military commission
convictions-had been repealed.52 The court also concluded that
the detainees had no constitutional right to claim the protection
of the Suspension Clause because they were aliens outside U.S.
territory." The dissenting judge argued that the Suspension
Clause served as a positive limit on Congress's power, and there-
fore the detainees' status and location were irrelevant. 4
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the MCA's
jurisdiction-stripping provision.55 Not surprisingly, the Court
agreed that section 7 of the MCA indeed sought to strip federal
courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by Guantd-
My own view at the time was that by deciding Hamdan on statutory interpretation
grounds, the Court was perhaps attempting to maneuver Congress into checking the Pres-
ident. With both political branches in the hands of the same political party, however, there
was no real check. See Tung Yin, Tom and Jerry (and Spike): A Metaphor for Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the President, the Court, and Congress in the War on Terrorism, 42 TULSA L.
REV. 505, 506, 535 (2007).
47. Terror Detainee Back in Australia, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, § 1, at 8.
48. William Glaberson, Panel Convicts Bin Laden Driver in Split Verdict, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2008, at Al.
49. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Office of the Assistant Sec'y of Def. (Public Af-
fairs), Hamdan Sentenced to 66 Months (Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://www.defense
link.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12128 (announcing Hamdan conviction and sen-
tence).
50. Civil Liberties: Detention Without Trial: The Stuff of Nightmares, THE ECONOMIST,
Oct. 6, 2007, at 70, 71.
51. 476 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
52. See id. at 987-88.
53. Id. at 991.
54. Id. at 995 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
55. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008).
[Vol. 43:865
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namo detainees.56 In the heart of its opinion, the Court considered
whether the detainees were protected by the Suspension Clause
and, if so, whether the MCA violated that constitutional provi-
sion. The Court first noted the role that the writ of habeas corpus
has traditionally played in protecting against executive abuse,
both in the United States and, before the Revolutionary War, in
England." The Court then reviewed the available historical
precedent concerning whether aliens located outside the formal
territory of the sovereign had access to the habeas writ-both the
government and the detainees had argued that their position was
supported by history.58 But after a long review of British practice
with regard to persons in India, Ireland, Scotland, and Canada,
the court found that history provided "no certain conclusions."59
The Court then considered whether the naval base on Guantd-
namo Bay was "outside" the United States and, if so, whether
that mattered. 60 According to the Court, a series of decisions from
the early twentieth century known as the Insular Cases laid the
groundwork for functional consideration of the extraterritorial
reach of the Constitution.61 In those cases, which involved the ap-
plicability of the Constitution in newly acquired territories such
as Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, the Court understood
the impracticability of total incorporation and instead adopted a
more flexible approach, guaranteeing only "'certain fundamental
personal rights."'62
56. Id. at 2242-44. Boumediene's argument to the contrary relied upon an unwieldy
textual argument that differentiated between "'a writ of habeas corpus" and "'any other
action ... relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions
of confinement of an alien.'" Id. at 2243. Boumediene contended that section 7 of the MCA
which stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over all "cases ... which relate to any aspect
of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien,"' there-
fore applied only to the second category of cases, not the first. Id. The Court rejected this
reading because (1) "other action" implied that habeas petitions were a type of action re-
lating to detention of aliens; and (2) the legislative and litigation history demonstrated
that the MCA was a clear congressional response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Id.
57. Id. at 2244-47.
58. Id. at 2248-51.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2251-53.
61. Id. at 2254 (citing Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904), limited by Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903), limited by Reid v. Co-
vert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), limited by Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United
States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901)).
62. See id. at 2254-55 (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922), limited
20091
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Building on the notion of "[piractical considerations," the Court
discussed the two key post-World War II extraterritoriality cases,
Reid v. Covert and Eisentrager" Covert involved two civilian
women who were convicted in courts martial of murdering their
soldier-husbands on American bases in foreign countries.64 In a
plurality opinion, the Court concluded that, despite the extrater-
ritorial location of their trials, the defendants were entitled to the
protection of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.65 The Boumediene
Court understood Covert to have turned on the fact that a jury
trial would not have been impractical.66
Similarly, the Boumediene Court read Eisentrager as focusing
on the crushing burden that habeas jurisdiction would have im-
posed on the military were federal courts to review the military
convictions of the German prisoners.6 The Court added a norma-
tive basis for its reasoning: allowing the political branches "to
switch the Constitution on or off at will" would upset "our tripar-
tite system of government, leading to a regime in which Congress
and the President, not this Court, say 'what the law is.""'6 In
short, the Court was skeptical of the President's motives for
transporting the detainees to Guantdnamo Bay and of Congress's
motives for enacting the DTA and the MCA.69
With all of that in mind, the Boumediene Court constructed a
test for "determining the reach of the Suspension Clause": (1) sta-
tus and citizenship of the detainee and the process by which those
determinations were made, (2) the places of capture and deten-
tion, and (3) "the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the
prisoner's entitlement to the writ." ° The Court examined the pro-
cedures of the CSRTs, concluding that they were insufficient to
by Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)).
63. Id. at 2255-58.
64. Covert, 354 U.S. at 3-4.
65. Id. at 18-19.
66. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2256-57.
67. Id. at 2257.
68. Id. at 2259 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
69. See id. ("The test for determining the scope of [the Suspension Clause] must not be
subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain.").
70. Id. This framework was derived from the Court's reading of Eisentrager's descrip-
tion of the relevant facts for those prisoners, which included their status as enemy aliens,
their capture and detention outside the United States, and their convictions in military
trials. See id. (discussing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950)).
[Vol. 43:865
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"eliminate the need for habeas corpus review."7 As to the second
factor, the Court conceded that the naval base was outside the
sovereign territory of the United States but concluded that "[i]n
every practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the
constant jurisdiction of the United States." 2 And, as to the third
factor, the Court reasoned that the practical concerns present in
Eisentrager were absent here, given the absolute control that the
United States exerts over Guantdnamo.73 Therefore, the Court
held that "[i]f the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the
detainees now before us, Congress must act in accordance with
the requirements of the Suspension Clause."74
Finally, the Court concluded that the DTA's creation of an ex-
clusive avenue of review to the D.C. Circuit of CSRT determina-
tions and military commission convictions was an "inadequate
substitute for habeas corpus."75 The DTA conferred on the D.C.
Circuit a "quite limited" jurisdictional grant; the Court was also
devoid of factfinding ability.76
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia each authored a dis-
senting opinion; both authors joined each other's opinion, as did
Justices Alito and Thomas.77 The main thrust of the Chief Jus-
tice's dissent was criticism of the Court's cavalier decision to dis-
card the D.C. Circuit review process created by Congress in favor
of "shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts at some
future date."" Because no detainee had yet availed himself of the
D.C. Circuit's review, it was impossible to know whether that re-
view process would be constitutionally inadequate assuming the
Constitution even applied.79 Chief Justice Roberts also argued
that the CSRTs, whose decisions were subject to review in the
D.C. Circuit, more than satisfied the standards laid out in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, which suggested the procedures to be used when an
American citizen challenges his detention as an enemy comba-
71. Id. at 2260. Specifically, the Court faulted the lack of an advocate to represent the
detainee, the presumption of validity accorded the government's evidence, and the general
inability of the detainee to rebut his classification as an enemy combatant. Id.
72. Id. at 2260-61.
73. Id. at 2261.
74. Id. at 2262.
75. Id. at 2274.
76. Id. at 2265-66.
77. See id. at 2279, 2293.
78. Id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2281-82.
2009]
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tant. ° In the end, he concluded, the majority merely spawned
"further litigation to determine the content of [the] new habeas
right, followed by further litigation to resolve... particular cases,
followed by further litigation before the D.C. Circuit.""l
Though agreeing with Chief Justice Roberts that the majority
opinion "accomplishe[d] little" in the long run, Justice Scalia de-
scribed its immediate consequences as "disastrous" and "devastat-
ing" because of the decision's negative impact on the President's
ability to fight Al-Qaeda."2 After delivering this prophecy, Justice
Scalia proceeded to criticize the Court's Suspension Clause analy-
sis on two fronts. First, he argued that whether the Suspension
Clause protected aliens detained outside the country, even if such
aliens were found in territory effectively controlled by the United
States, was sufficiently in dispute such that the Court should
have presumed Congress's action constitutional. 3 Second, he dis-
puted the majority's assertions that historical practice pointed to
no clear resolution of the entitlement of aliens outside the country
to habeas corpus' and that separation of powers required that
the Court be available to challenge the executive branch's mani-
pulation of the law in its attempt to create a law-free zone. Jus-
tice Scalia accused the majority of "blatantly misdescrib[ing] im-
portant precedents,... break[ing] a chain of precedent as old as
the common law," and setting an "impossible task" for military
commanders.8 6
D. Detainees and Counsel
Whether one agrees with Boumediene's ultimate outcome,
there is some validity to Chief Justice Roberts's criticism of the
majority's failure to detail the procedures to be followed in re-
80. Id. at 2284-86 (discussing the due process standard set forth in Hamdi v. Rums-
feld, 542 U.S. 507, (2004)).
81. Id. at 2293.
82. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2296 ("Henceforth . . . how to
handle enemy prisoners in this war will ultimately lie with the branch that knows least
about the national security concerns that the subject entails.").
83. See id. at 2296-98.
84. Id. at 2305 ("In sum, all available historical evidence points to the conclusion that
the writ would not have been available at common law for aliens captured and held out-
side the sovereign territory of the Crown.").
85. See id. at 2302-03.
86. Id. at 2307.
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viewing habeas challenges to detention at Guant~namo Bay. The
Court itself was explicit about the limits of its opinion," and
made clear just two requirements: (1) "the privilege of habeas
corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to dem-
onstrate that he is being held pursuant to 'the erroneous applica-
tion or interpretation' of relevant law,""8 and (2) "the habeas court
must have the power to order the conditional release of an indi-
vidual unlawfully detained." 9
Do these requirements shed any light on the role that counsel
plays in the procedures that the Court envisions? In one sense,
the question is easily answered, as nothing in the DTA and MCA
purports to restrict the detainees' access to counsel in the D.C.
Circuit proceedings, to the extent that they are able to procure
the services of an attorney at their own expense or pro bono. And
since even state prisoners in the United States who seek habeas
relief have no constitutional right to be provided counsel at public
expense,90 there is no reason to believe that Guantdnamo detai-
nees would be entitled to appointed counsel. Thus, it seems clear
that Boumediene permits, but does not require, counsel at the
D.C. Circuit review stage.
Yet, there is more to be said on the subject. In traditional fed-
eral habeas corpus review of state-court convictions, the prisoner
had at least one complete proceeding in which there was a consti-
tutional right to counsel-namely, the state trial.9' If that law-
yer's performance was constitutionally ineffective, the prisoner
may be entitled to a new trial.92 In the Guant~namo detainee con-
text, on the other hand, it appears possible that a detainee might
go through the entire process of challenging his status as an
enemy combatant-from CSRT through federal habeas corpus-
without the assistance of an attorney.
93
87. Id. at 2266 (majority opinion) ("We do not endeavor to offer a comprehensive
summary of the requisites for an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.").
88. Id. (quoting Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302
(2001)).
89. Id.
90. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609-11 (1974) (denying a constitutional right to
state-funded counsel for post-conviction relief).
91. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-45 (1963) (holding that an indigent
criminal defendant is entitled to appointed defense counsel).
92. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984).
93. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260. As a practical matter, public interest litiga-
tion groups and national law firms have been lining up to represent Guant~namo detai-
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Though Boumediene did not explicitly condemn the possible
absence of legal representation throughout the combatant-status-
challenge process, one can infer the Court's sense of the impor-
tance of counsel throughout the opinion. For example, in conclud-
ing that CSRT proceedings fell "well short of the procedures and
adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas
corpus review," the very first deficiency that the Court identified
was that "[a]lthough the detainee is assigned a 'Personal Repre-
sentative' to assist him during CSRT proceedings, the Secretary
of the Navy's memorandum makes clear that person is not the de-
tainee's lawyer or even his 'advocate."'94
One might argue that the detainee does not need a lawyer to
serve as his advocate if the single issue is the detainee's comba-
tant status, for combatant status is what makes one a legitimate
military target; thus, all combat soldiers in theory should be
trained to make that determination.95 Of course, there may well
be a difference between training to make a decision in the heat of
combat versus during the more deliberative review process after
the shooting has stopped. In any event, the Secretary of the
Navy's regulations go beyond even this minimal level of assis-
tance by providing no advocate at all.96 Therefore, unless the de-
tainee himself has a working knowledge of the modern law of
war, it may be unreasonable to expect that he can successfully
represent himself unassisted through the combatant-status-
challenge process.
Note also the Court's emphasis on the need to provide a mea-
ningful opportunity to challenge combatant status.97 The Court's
ensuing discussion noted that a detainee faces daunting obstacles
in doing so under the existing process, among them that "[h]e
does not have the assistance of counsel."9 The lack of counsel
compounds the detainee's limited "ability to rebut the Govern-
nees on a pro bono basis on their habeas petitions. See, e.g., Christian Berthelsen & Stuart
Pfeifer, Why Carona's Defense Is 'Free', L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008, at B1.
94. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260 (citation omitted).
95. See Yin, supra note 24, at 1110-11.
96. Memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy on Implementation of Combatant
Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantinamo Bay
Naval Base, Cuba (July 29, 2004), available at http://www.defense.link.mil/news/jul2004/d
20040730comb.pdf. Detainees are given the assistance of a Personal Representative who is
"neither a lawyer nor [an] advocate" for the detainee. Id. at encl. (3).
97. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266.
98. Id. at 2269.
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ment's evidence against him."99 Counsel, being free from confine-
ment, can help locate witnesses or documents that the detainee
might not be able to access.
III. LAWFARE
In a 2001 paper, then-U.S. Air Force Colonel Charles Dunlap,
Jr., questioned whether international law had begun to obstruct
U.S. military operations such as those in Kosovo in the late
1990s; along the way, he described the concept of "lawfare" as
"the use of law as a weapon of war." °0 Dunlap argued that the
goal of U.S. opponents engaging in lawfare was to sap public sup-
port for such armed conflict by "mak[ing] it appear that the U.S.
is waging war in violation of the letter or spirit of' international
law. 10 1 Building on Dunlap's concept, former Department of Jus-
tice ("DOJ") lawyers David Rivkin and Lee Casey have argued
that "Al Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgents ... routinely claim that
American forces systematically violate the laws of war" with the
goal of "undermining America's political will to win."1 2 The 2005
iteration of the Pentagon's National Defense Strategy notes that
the United States "will continue to be challenged by those who
employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial
processes, and terrorism." "'
It is important to note that this is not the only modern use of
the term "lawfare." Critics of the Bush Administration have
argued that the administration, not Guantdnamo detainees or
their lawyers, is the one engaging in lawfare. David Luban
contends that the government has actively "made it more difficult
for lawyers to provide legal representation to Guantdnamo
prisoners" through tactics such as manipulation of flight
99. Id. at 2260.
100. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian
Values in 21st Century Conflicts 5, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%
20Working%2OPapers/Use%20ofo2OForce/Dunlap200l.pdf.
101. Id. at 11.
102. Rivkin & Casey, supra note 8; see also Eric Talbot Jensen, The ICJ's "Uganda
Wall". A Barrier to the Principle of Distinction and an Entry Point for Lawfare, 35 DENv. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 241, 260-67 (2007) (discussing International Court of Justice opinions
that have made it easier for practitioners of lawfare to use the law of war against com-
pliant nations).
103. DEP'T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 5 (2005), available at http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/offices/dami-zxgNat
ional%20Defense%20Strategy%2OMarO5-U.pdf.
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schedules to make travel difficult and disparagement of the
lawyers to detainees. °4 For the purposes of this paper, however, I
will focus on the Rivkin/Casey designation.
A. Al-Qaeda Training Manuals
U.S. officials have repeatedly referred to A1-Qaeda training
manuals that teach suspected fighters to falsely claim that they
have been tortured,"' to use lawyers to transmit secret messag-
es, 106 or "to use America's freedom as a weapon against us."10 7 Ac-
cording to a former U.S. interrogator stationed in Iraq, one such
A1-Qaeda manual obtained by British authorities informed its
readers that "[t]he Americans 'will not harm you physical-
ly,... they must be tempted into doing so. And if they do strike a
brother, you must complain to the authorities immediately.' It
added that the baiting of Americans should be sufficient to result
in an attack that leaves 'evidence." 08
In other words, there is evidence that the Al-Qaeda leadership
has studied U.S. law and interrogation practices and synthesized
a strategy that seeks to exploit the legal limits on interrogation.
If the purpose of informing the reader that he will not be tortured
during interrogation is to urge the reader to remain silent if cap-
tured, it would hardly appear sinister. Some federal courts, for
example, have concluded that a defendant does not obstruct jus-
tice when he merely urges a witness not to tell the police any-
thing."9
104. David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantdnamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981,
1983, 1989-90, 1996 (2008).
105. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, Australia Uneasy About U.S. Detainee Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, § 1, at 10 (discussing the detention and alleged torture of David
Hicks).
106. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, U.S. Argues War Detainee Shouldn't See a Lawyer,
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2002, at A10.
107. Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending
Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 311 (2002)
(statement of John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
108. CHRIS MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE INTERROGATORS: TASK FORCE 500 AND
AMERICA'S SECRET WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA 179 (2005); see also Rivkin, & Casey, supra
note 8 (stating that the Al.Qaeda training manual instructs detained fighters to claim tor-
ture and abuse to gain "a moral advantage over their captors").
109. See, e.g., United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 489 (3d Cir. 1997). But see United
States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part by Arthur An-
derson LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (rejecting Farrell).
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But the quoted portion of the manual goes further and exhorts
the reader to provoke a violent reaction for the purpose of getting
the interrogator in trouble with his or her supervisors.110 Need-
less to say, the best course of action for an interrogator in such a
situation is to resist the provocation. Even so, should it be irrele-
vant that the physical attack would not have occurred but for the
detainee's premeditated goading? The entrapment defense, for
example, excuses some types of criminal conduct induced by law
enforcement officers where the defendant "would not have perpe-
trated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the offic-
er. 111 The analogy has limits, to be sure, given that entrapment
might not excuse violent conduct,112 which might be especially sa-
lient given the control that the interrogator can maintain over the
detainee.113 The point is that the entrapment defense recognizes
that when police officers induce defendants into committing
crimes that otherwise would not have been committed, the offic-
ers have, in a sense, attempted to manipulate and exploit the law
improperly. In the same way, an Al-Qaeda member who provokes
an interrogator may suffer an injury, but that member is also at-
tempting to manipulate and exploit the controls that we place on
our interrogators.
Finally, the alleged instructions to make false claims of torture
and to use attorneys to pass secret messages clearly seek to take
unfair advantage of our legal system. A false claim of torture is
not merely frivolous, but akin to malicious prosecution: an inten-
tional misuse of the judicial system for the purpose of inflicting
unlawful harm on the victim."' By falsely claiming to have been
tortured, an A1-Qaeda member can force the opening of an invest-
110. See supra text accompanying note 108.
111. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
112. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Most states,
however, have not so limited the entrapment defense. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5.1(c) n.17 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that only Delaware, Hawaii, Ken-
tucky, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Utah have so limited the entrapment de-
fense).
113. For some examples of the methods an interrogator may use to control a detainee,
see TONY LAGOURANIS & ALLEN MIKAELIAN, FEAR UP HARSH: AN ARMY INTERROGATOR'S
DARK JOURNEY THROUGH IRAQ 30 (2007).
114. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 977-78 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "malicious prosecu-
tion").
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igation, tying up resources and possibly leading the government
to throw away a trained asset."5
Using an attorney to pass secret messages to other A1-Qaeda
members distorts the attorney-client relationship beyond its in-
tended purpose. All communications between the client and the
lawyer for the purpose of seeking legal advice are protected from
disclosure by the attorney-client privilege; the privilege recogniz-
es the need to facilitate the free-flow of information between
client and lawyer to ensure the effective adversarial presentation
of the client's case." 6 Although the privilege may well conceal re-
levant evidence from the court, the legal system has concluded
that this detriment is outweighed by the need to preserve client
confidences; in this way, the client will feel free to confide fully in
his or her lawyer, thereby ensuring that the lawyer can give the
most accurate legal advice." 7
Yet, there is an important exception to information protected
by the attorney-client privilege: communications between client
and lawyer about prospective criminal conduct (as opposed to
past, completed crimes) are not privileged.1 ' In United States v.
Zolin, the Supreme Court explained that the attorney-client privi-
lege imposes costs on society by "'withholding relevant informa-
tion from the factfinder"' and therefore "'applies only where ne-
cessary to achieve its purpose.""' 9 Using lawyers to pass secret
messages to others goes beyond the purpose of the privilege, par-
ticularly if intended to "be helpful to [other members] in their
115. Given the chronic shortage of trained Arabic speakers available to the U.S. gov-
ernment, this is not a trivial matter. See, e.g., Darlene Superville, U.S. Still Tongue-Tied
When It Comes to Speaking Arabic, Cfu. TRIB., Nov. 21, 2003, at 38.
116. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.
Mass. 1950) (summarizing common law elements and purposes of attorney-client privi-
lege).
117. Id. at 358 ("The social good derived from the proper performance of the functions
of lawyers acting for their clients is believed to outweigh the harm that may come from the
suppression of the evidence in specific cases.") (quoting MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE R. 210
cmt. a (1942)); see The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure:
The Attorney-Client Privilege: Upjohn Co. v. United States, 95 HARV. L. REV. 270, 274-76
(1981) (summarizing costs and benefits of the attorney-client privilege).
118. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989), vacated and remanded by
Church of Scientology v. United States, 503 U.S. 934 (1992).
119. Id. at 562 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
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work outside prison"' 2 -that is, to assist other terrorists in avoid-
ing the authorities.12'
In short, the training manuals appear to instruct Al-Qaeda
members to exploit the U.S. legal system, not for the legitimate
purpose of vindicating one's legal rights, but for the purpose of
continuing asymmetric warfare against the United States.
B. Lynne Stewart as a Case Study
It is one thing to denounce detainees who purposefully manipu-
late and exploit the faultlines in American law by falsely claiming
torture or deliberately provoking attacks by interrogators. It is an
altogether different matter to spread that criticism to lawyers
representing detainees. Is lawfare practiced by individual lawyers
a figment of paranoiac imagination, or the new insidious reality?
There have been extreme suggestions that the mere representa-
tion of suspected A1-Qaeda fighters amounts to fighting against
the United States. For example, in early 2007, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs Charles Stimson named
a number of national law firms that were representing Guanti-
namo detainees and then said, "'I think, quite honestly, when
corporate C.E.O.'s see that those firms are representing the very
terrorists who hit their bottom line back in 2001, those C.E.O.'s
are going to make those law firms choose between representing
terrorists or representing reputable firms."'122 However, even key
members of the Bush Administration rejected that view, 123 as has
Dunlap.'24
120. See THE AL QAEDA MANUAL, UK/BM-176 to UK/BM-180, Lesson Eighteen, http:ll
www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpartl-4.pdf. According to the Department of Justice, this ma-
nual was found in Manchester, England, in the possession of a suspected Al-Qaeda mem-
ber. See THE AL QAEDA MANUAL, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/manualpartl-l.pdf.
121. Of course, there could be a more innocuous purpose, such as simply conveying in-
formation, say, about the captured prisoner's whereabouts to family members. But if that
were the motivation, there would be no need for the secrecy urged in the training manual.
122. Neil A. Lewis, Official Attacks Top Law Firms Over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
13, 2007, at Al. While Stimson did not go so far as to accuse such law firms as engaging in
treason, the implication of his charge was that they were assisting the enemy.
123. Id. (quoting then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, who defended the law firms
in their choice of representation).
124. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, YALE J. IN'L AFF., Winter
2008, at 146, 148 (2008) ("To be clear, I condemn any interpretation of lawfare which
would cast terrorists as those legitimately using the courts to challenge any governmental
action.").
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Perhaps the closest example one can find of a defense lawyer
actively assisting terrorists under the guise of practicing law is
the controversial prosecution and conviction in 2005 of New York
attorney Lynne Stewart for providing material support to a des-
ignated terrorist organization. 125 Stewart, who describes herself
on her website as a "[r]adical human rights attorney," '126 built her
legal career largely by representing poor, minority clients accused
of criminal conduct, including cases involving "police brutality,
the Black liberation movement, secret evidence, bias crime, ter-
rorism, and apartheid."127 It was unsurprising then that she
represented Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman in his 1995 criminal
trial for his involvement in the 1993 truck bomb attack on the
World Trade Center, 128 and continued to do so after his convic-
tion.'29 Also known as the Blind Sheikh, 3 ° Abdel Rahman has
been the spiritual leader of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya ("the Islamic
Group"), a designated foreign terrorist organization responsible
for terrorist attacks in Egypt and Ethiopia.' 3 '
It is here that Stewart arguably crossed the line from zealous
advocacy into something criminal. According to the government,
in May 2000, Stewart visited Abdel Rahman, ostensibly for attor-
ney-client purposes, but in reality to allow him to exchange mes-
sages with his followers through Stewart's translator. 32 The in-
dictment against Stewart charged that, during this meeting, she
concealed the fact that she was not involved in the conversation
between Abdel Rahman and the translator "by having [the trans-
lator] look periodically at Stewart and Abdel Rahman in turn"
and by "pretend[ing] to be participating in the conversation.., by
making extraneous comments such as 'chocolate' and 'heart at-
125. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Lawyer Is Due for Sentencing in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 2006, at B1 (describing controversy over guilty verdict for Stewart).
126. Justice for Lynne Stewart, http://www.lynnestewart.org/ (last visited Feb. 20,
2009).
127. Brief and Special Appendix for Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee Lynne Ste-
wart at 9, United States v. Sattar, No. 06-5015-CR(L), (2d Cir. June 29, 2007) available at
http://www.lynnestewart.org/)-BriefforDefendant-Appellant-Cross-AppelleeLynneStewart.
pdf.
128. See Richard Bernstein, Biggest U.S. Terrorist Trial Begins as Arguments Clash,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at Al (covering Stewart's advocacy as counsel for Rahman).
129. See George Packer, Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
130. See Appraisal of Threat Posed by Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2004, § 1, at 17.
131. OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2007, 277-78 (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/105904.pdf.
132. See United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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tack.'""'33 Stewart was apparently aware that she was acting un-
lawfully because she and the translator laughed while agreeing
that "they would get 'in trouble' if the guards knew that the
translator was reading Abdel Rahman a letter from one of his fol-
lowers."' It is perhaps no coincidence that Justice Scalia implied
in his dissenting opinion in Boumediene that Abdel Rahman's
lawyers had passed critical information to Osama bin Laden. 3 '
Analysis of the Stewart conviction is admittedly complicated by
the fact that the government had to change its theory of the case.
Initially, the government charged that Stewart had provided the
Islamic Group with material support such as communications
equipment and personnel, the latter including herself.136 After the
district court dismissed the counts of the indictment on the theory
that they were unconstitutionally vague, the government secured
a superseding indictment that charged Stewart with providing
the Islamic Group material support such as personnel, including
Abdel Rahman."3 ' This mid-case change of theory heightened the
suspicions of Stewart's supporters that she was being unfairly
targeted because of her reputation for aggressive advocacy on be-
half of her clients, and was viewed by some as an effort to "chill"
other defense attorneys representing suspected terrorists.
138
Nevertheless, the Stewart case stands out among the post-9/11
terrorism prosecutions as featuring a defense lawyer as a defen-
dant. Whether this is due to the fact that lawyers do not engage
in lawfare or that it is extremely difficult to detect such lawfare is
discussed in the next Part.
133. See Indictment para. 30.m, United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (No. 02 Cr. 395), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/uslstwrt
111903sind.html.
134. Id. para. 30.n.
135. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing S.
REP. No. 110-90, pt. 7, at 14-15 (2007).
136. See 272 F. Supp. 2d. at 356, 359.
137. See United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
138. See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, The Conviction of Lynne Stewart and the Uncertain
Future of the Right to Defend, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 12 (2006); Lynne Stewart, Defending
the Right to Defend, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 85, 94-95 (2003); see also United States v.
Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 94-95 (D. Mass. 2002) ("Whatever the merits of [the Lynne Ste-
wart] indictment, its chilling effect on those courageous attorneys who represent society's
most despised outcasts cannot be gainsaid."); Molly McDonough, Translators Worry: "Am I
Next?", A.B.A. J. REP., Mar. 11, 2005, at 10, 10 (noting that translators began fearing "jail
time simply for doing their jobs, or ... be[ing] held accountable for illegal acts committed
by lawyers").
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IV. BOUMEDIENE, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Nowhere did the majority opinion in Boumediene mention,
much less discuss, lawfare, but the clear implication was that the
Court does not see lawfare as posing a sufficient threat to the na-
tion to warrant denial of counsel. Is the Court being unduly opti-
mistic or naive?
The government has tools available to protect itself from the
threat of lawfare by lawyers representing Guantdnamo detainees,
among them (1) requiring security clearance for lawyers who seek
access to classified information;139 and (2) using separate teams of
agents and lawyers to monitor detainee-attorney conversations. 4 °
A. Requiring Security Clearance for Lawyers
Recall that Justice Scalia implied in his dissent in Boumediene
that Osama bin Laden was in possession of the names of 200 un-
indicted co-conspirators (some of whom were presumably coope-
rating with the government) within two weeks of those names
having been provided to defense lawyers who were defending the
Blind Sheikh from prosecution.' Litigating the enemy comba-
tant status of Guantdnamo detainees may well involve classified
information concerning intelligence-gathering techniques, human
sources, and military tactical positioning, among other classified
things."' One could be legitimately concerned if one believed that
lawyers might intentionally or inadvertently pass along such in-
formation to Al-Qaeda.
Yet, the government currently requires that lawyers repre-
senting Guantdnamo detainees obtain security clearances before
being allowed to meet with their clients.' Private lawyers have
139. See 28 C.F.R. § 17.41(a)-(b) (2008).
140. See id. § 501.3(d).
141. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia also noted that trial tes-
timony in a different case "revealed to the enemy that the United States had been moni-
toring their cellular network, whereupon they promptly stopped using it." Boumediene v.
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2295 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 2276 (majority opinion).
143. See, e.g., Josh White & Joby Warrick, U.S. To Allow Key Detainees To Request
Lawyers; 14 Terrorism Suspects Given Legal Forms at Guantdnamo, WASH. POST, Sept.
28, 2007, at Al; see also supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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described the process of obtaining such security clearance as
onerous and burdensome, which may have the (un)intended effect
of deterring such representation.'"
The goal of the security clearance background investigation is,
of course, to determine "whether the circumstances of a particular
case, taking into consideration prior experience with similar cas-
es, reasonably suggest a degree of probability of prejudicial beha-
vior not consistent with the national security."145 Perhaps such in-
tense background investigations are unnecessary. One com-
mentator seems to argue that criminal defense lawyers are inhe-
rently reliable and trustworthy, particularly because they "are
keenly aware that they risk criminal prosecution for unautho-
rized disclosure of such information." '146 Lynne Stewart's prosecu-
tion was widely publicized and no doubt generated significant de-
terrent value.147 But, in relation to the monitoring proposal
described below, Akhil and Vikram Amar have suggested that the
government create an "Honors list" of "approved lawyers who
meet the highest ethical standards-say, former Justice Depart-
ment officials" and allow greater latitude for such lawyers. 4 ' In
addition, in high-stakes cases, given the Stewart precedent-
however aberrant an example it might be-one might argue that
the consequences of an attorney's breach of security can be so de-
vastating that the government would be remiss in not taking
available steps to minimize its likelihood.
144. See Neil A. Lewis, In Rising Numbers, Lawyers Head for Guantdnamo Bay, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2005, at A10; Neil A. Lewis, Rules Set up for Terror Tribunals May Deter
Some Defense Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, § 1, at 1 (noting that the cost of obtain-
ing a security clearance can be as high as $2,800); Adam Liptak, The Right to Counsel, in
the Right Situations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2008, at All (noting the "exhaustive investiga-
tion" required for security clearance). For an explanation of the process involved in apply-
ing for security clearance, see William H. Miller, A Position of Trust: Security Clearance
Decisions After September 11, 2001, 14 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 229, 235-38 (2004).
145. 32 C.F.R. § 154.40(b) (2008).
146. Ellen C. Yaroshefsky, The Slow Erosion of the Adversary System: Article III
Courts, FISA, CIPA and Ethical Dilemmas, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 203, 231
(2006).
147. See, e.g., Michael Powell, Lawyer Sentenced for Aiding Terrorist Client: 28 Months
Is Far Less Than Government Sought, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2006, at A03; Julia Preston,
Sheik's Lawyer, Facing 30 Years, Gets 28 Months, to Dismay of U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2006, at Al.
148. Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, The New Regulation Allowing Federal
Agents To Monitor Attorney-Client Conversations: Why It Threatens Fourth Amendment
Values, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2002).
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To be sure, such a requirement is not without costs. In the typ-
ical instance of criminal defense in an Article III court, security
clearance is required to access classified information. 149 A lawyer
who is unable or unwilling to obtain the necessary security clear-
ance may find it difficult to represent his or her client effectively
when denied access to critical evidence. 50 As Brian Tamanaha
notes, this "gives the Department of Justice the ability to control
who will work on classified matters for the defense."' 5 ' However,
at least one district court has expressed confidence in its ability to
review the government's security clearance decisions: "[Iun the
unlikely event that DOJ officials recommend that the Court deny
any counsel's application for clearance, this result would be ap-
pealable both within the DOJ as well as directly to the Court."52
Would a security clearance requirement impede lawfare? If we
are hypothesizing lawfare by lawyers, then the answer depends
on how effective the government's background investigation is at
unearthing such lawyers. The government certainly appears to
cast a wide net in terms of persons to interview. I seem to meet
with a special investigator from the FBI about once or twice a
year concerning former students who have been hired by the
DOJ, based on as little as one three-unit class for which I have
been their instructor.
It seems likely that the government might err on the side of
denying security clearance to "troublesome" lawyers, as opposed
to on the side of granting security clearance to secretly disloyal
lawyers. The DOJ regulations on the subject call for the govern-
ment to ascertain whether a person has sufficient indicia of
"loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthi-
ness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound judgment, as well
as freedom from conflicting allegiances and potential for coer-
cion."153 These indicia, "loyalty to the United States," "discretion,"
and "sound judgment," are sufficiently ambiguous so as to allow
the government to argue that tenacious attorneys, particularly
those committed to public interest causes, do not measure up.
149. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Critical Review of the Classified Information Proce-
dures Act, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277, 288 (1986).
150. See id. at 288.
151. Id. at 289.
152. United States v. Bin Laden, 58 F. Supp. 2d 113, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
153. 28 C.F.R. § 17.41(b) (2008).
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If lawfare by defense lawyers is truly of concern, the security
clearance requirement can be an effective, if overbroad, tool for
the government to protect itself.
B. Monitoring Privileged Conversations
To the extent that the security clearance requirement is viewed
as insufficiently protective against the threat of lawfare, the gov-
ernment can further guard itself by actively monitoring conversa-
tions between detainees and their counsel.154 Because such con-
versations are presumptively protected by the attorney-client
privilege, any such monitoring must be undertaken with caution
so as not to violate legitimate invocations of that privilege.
Typically, the government attempts to satisfy that obligation
by designating a "privilege team" that is distinct and walled off
from the investigating/prosecuting team.155 Although such walls
are generally deemed inadequate when it comes to imputed dis-
qualification of private lawyers,'56 government lawyers are not
subject to the same rule.' Thus, the "privilege team" can monitor
conversations or engage in other similar conduct that would re-
quire intrusion into privileged communications (as might happen
during the search of a lawyer's office), segregate arguably unpri-
vileged conversations or material, and seek court approval for the
disclosure of such items to the investigating/prosecuting team. 5 '
154. See id. § 501.3(d) (permitting monitoring where "reasonable suspicion exists to
believe that a particular inmate may use communications with attorneys or their agents to
further or facilitate acts of terrorism").
155. Id. § 501.3(d)(3) ("To protect the attorney-client privilege and to ensure that the
investigation is not compromised by exposure to privileged material ... a privilege team
shall be designated, consisting of individuals not involved in the underlying investiga-
tion.").
156. See, e.g., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 99, 999-1001 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that an
entire law firm would be disqualified if one attorney would be disqualified due to prior re-
presentation of a client in a matter substantially related to current adverse representa-
tion).
157. See United States v. Mapelli, 971 F.2d 284, 287-88 (9th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Caggiano, 660 F.2d 184, 190-91 (6th Cir. 1981); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Re-
sponsibility, Formal Op. 342, (1975), reprinted at 62 A.B.A. J. 517 (1976). The reason for
the different treatment of government lawyers is practical: "[Tihe client is not significantly
prejudiced when the entire law firm is disqualified . . . because the client is free to hire
another law firm .... In the case of government agencies, however, this assumption fails."
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Targets, 918 F. Supp. 1374, 1378 n.11 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
158. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3); Majorie Cohn, The Evisceration of the Attorney-Client
Privilege in the Wake of September 11, 2001, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1242-43 (2003).
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The efficacy of monitoring attorney-client communications is
demonstrated by Lynne Stewart's conviction. The inculpatory
evidence against Stewart consisted of tape recordings of the con-
versations between the translator, Yousry, and Abdel Rahman,
15 9
along with Stewart's admission that she violated the rules.160 The
government obtained the recordings through its monitoring of
Abdel Rahman and Stewart under a warrant obtained from the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 61 Abdel Rahman was al-
so subject to so-called special administrative measures ("SAMs"),
per Bureau of Prison regulations, which also called for monitoring
of his conversations.162
Monitoring of privileged communications is an extremely con-
troversial issue, for both legal and pragmatic reasons.163 Numer-
ous commentators have argued that such monitoring legally de-
stroys the attorney-client privilege because the communication is
no longer limited to the presence of the attorney and the client.'64
In addition, when the government discloses in advance the fact
that attorney-client communications may be monitored, as is
done with the Bureau of Prison SAMs, 65 there must be a chilling
effect on the lawyer and the client, who are forced to trust that
159. See Julia Preston, Tapes Fall Short of Revealing a Terror Sheik's Call to Jihad,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at B2.
160. See Julia Preston, Lawyer Is Due for Sentencing in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
16, 2006, at B1.
161. See Rachel Zabarkes Friedman, Lawyer ofJihad, NAT'L REV., Aug. 23, 2004, at 29,
31. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 created the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court ("FISC"), to be staffed by federal district and appellate judges selected
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2006). Where the gov-
ernment seeks to engage in domestic surveillance for the purpose of gathering foreign in-
telligence, and where such surveillance may intercept communications by United States
citizens or residents, the government needs a warrant issued by the FISC. See id. §
1801(h).
162. See Molly McDonough, Lawyer Charged with Aiding Terrorists, A.B.A. J. EREPORT
Apr. 12, 2002, at 14 (noting that SAMs limited Abdel Rahman's "access to the mail, media,
telephone and visitors").
163. See generally Charlie Cassidy & Cassandra Porsch, Government Monitoring of At-
torney-Client Communications in Terrorism-Related Cases: Ethical Implications for De-
fense Attorneys, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 681 (2004); Cohn, supra note 158; Teri Dobbins,
Protecting the Unpopular from the Unreasonable: Warrantless Monitoring of Attorney
Client Communications in Federal Prisons, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 295 (2004); Sharon Jeff-
rey, An Act of Patriotism? Infringing on the Individual's Sixth Amendment Right to Effec-
tive Counsel, 33 Sw. U. L. REV. 165 (2004); Ellen S. Podgor & John Wesley Hall, Govern-
ment Surveillance of Attorney-Client Communications: Invoked in the Name of Fighting
Terrorism, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 145 (2003).
164. See, e.g., Heidi Boghosian, Taint Teams and Firewalls: Thin Armor for Attorney-
Client Privilege, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L. POLY & ETHICS J. 15, 20 (2003).
165. Id. at 19-20 & n.22.
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the "privilege team" will not share material with the investiga-
tion/prosecution team.166 As one commentator argues, in the ter-
rorism context, the "privilege team" may feel the need to share
overheard information out of the possibility that it might be re-
lated to a future attack.'67 Finally, the legal authority for such
monitoring impacts the concern for potential government over-
reaching: whereas monitoring pursuant to a Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FISA") warrant requires the approval of Ar-
ticle III judges, monitoring pursuant to SAMs is premised entire-
ly on Executive Branch control. 6 '
Because Guantdnamo Bay is outside the United States, FISA's
warrant requirements do not apply to government surveillance of
persons, whether aliens or citizens.'69 Arguably, however, known
monitoring of communications involving American lawyers at
Guantdnamo might still require some form of judicial authoriza-
tion. 17
0
As with the security clearance requirement, the monitoring of
privileged conservations may well be overkill, given its potential-
ly chilling effects on the detainees. At the same time, where the
government has a reasonable basis to suspect that a defense law-
yer may be assisting a detainee in engaging in lawfare, careful
monitoring of conversations will likely detect the plot. Because
such monitoring can have value but also raises concerns of chill-
ing, it should be authorized via FISA rather than SAMs, given
the need for judicial authorization of FISA warrants.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether one views Boumediene as the Court's shining moment
in standing up to the political branches' attempt to short-circuit
the Constitution, or as the latest interference by the branch least-
qualified to opine on the matter, it seems clear that Chief Justice
166. Podgor & Hall, supra note 163, at 162.
167. See Boghosian, supra note 164, at 21 (quoting Kate Martin of the Center for Na-
tional Security Studies).
168. Cf. Amar & Amar, supra note 148, at 1167 (arguing for videotaping of attorney-
client communications and allowing review by a judge prior to review by an executive
branch agent).
169. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f), (j) (2006).
170. See, e.g., Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 159 (D.D.C.
1976).
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Roberts was at least correct that the opinion would generate fu-
ture litigation.
In so holding, the Court decisively rejected the idea that detai-
nee litigation itself was lawfare, as well as the notion that law-
yers were too dangerous to be allowed to represent detainees.
Here, the Court was perhaps influenced by the paucity of actual
instances of lawyers intentionally conspiring with terrorist
clients, coupled with the fact that the government's available
counter-terrorism tools enabled it to detect and punish one such
high-profile example. This is not to say that requiring security
clearances for detainee representation or monitoring privileged
communications is necessarily desirable. Serious concerns have
been raised about both practices in terms of their impact on the
attorney-client relationship and its effectiveness. It is enough to
say that if lawfare were ever to be deemed a serious enough
threat to national security so as to call for response, these two
techniques would be less drastic measures than altogether denial
of counsel, and there is every reason to think that requiring secu-
rity clearances and monitoring privileged conversations would be
effective at countering lawfare.
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